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Abstract 
 
Grexit was narrowly averted in summer 2015. Nevertheless, the view that Greece might be 
better off outside the Euro area has never really gone away. Moreover, although Marine Le 
Pen’s bid for the French presidency was frustrated in May 2017, in Italy a disparate coalition, 
encompassing Beppe Grillo’s Movimento Cinque Stelle as well as Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord, has 
called for a referendum on exiting the Euro. In this context, our argument that Grexit cannot 
save Greece may be of some relevance to national debates elsewhere in Europe. The paper 
examines the case for Grexit by offering a detailed account of its likely effects. Its structure is as 
follows. Section 2 analyses the transition, with the two currencies (old and new) coexisting. 
Section 3 charts the challenges facing the Greek economy in the short term, after the new 
national currency has become legal tender. Section 4 assesses prospects in the medium term, 
with Grexit complete and the new currency drastically devalued. Section 5 reviews the 
underlying weaknesses of Greece’s growth regime and explains why these are unrelated to the 
nominal exchange rate. Section 6 discusses the conditions for an investment-led recovery, and 
shows why tackling them would be more difficult outside the Euro area. Section 7 sums up 
and concludes. 
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Why Grexit cannot save Greece (but staying 
in the Euro area might) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2010s have been dramatic for Greece – far more so than for any other 
European country. GDP declined by 26% in 2008-2013, then stagnated (+0.1% 
in 2013-2016). 1  Compared to the west European average, relative living 
standards in Greece, having risen from 74% in 2000 to 85% in 2009, fell to 62% 
in 2016 (below their 1961 level). 2  Employment, earnings and disposable 
incomes all plummeted, while unemployment and poverty soared. The Greek 
crisis has few historical precedents. It rivals the US Great Depression of 1929-
1932. 
The political upheaval discredited the parties that ruled the country during the 
previous four decades, and led in January 2015 to the election of an anti-
austerity coalition, whose ascendancy was confirmed in the snap general 
election of September 2015. The ensuing confrontation with the country’s 
European partners, culminated with the government signing up to a third 
                                                 
 1  By comparison, Spain (-8.9%), Italy (-7.6%) and Portugal (-7.8%) all suffered a less deep recession over the same period, and have since experienced some recovery (Spain: +7.9%; Italy: +1.8%; Portugal: +3.9%). See GDP and main components (output, expenditure and income) [nama_10_gdp]. Source: Eurostat. 2 Portugal and Spain also lost ground in the early years of the Eurozone crisis, but have more recently narrowed the distance. See Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population (HVGDPR) in purchasing power standards, relative to the EU-15 average. Source: AMECO Eurostat. 
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austerity programme in July 2015 just a week after the voters had rejected a 
version of it in the July 2015 referendum. It transpired that a quick fix to the 
Greek crisis was not possible. 
The view that Greece might be better off outside the Euro area gained some 
ascendancy. Eminent economists urged Greeks to vote ‘No’ at the July 2015 
referendum – on the grounds that uncertainty and dwindling living standards 
were still preferable to ‘the policy regime of the past five years’ (Paul Krugman) 
or to the ‘unconscionable torture of the present’ (Joseph Stiglitz). In Europe, the 
main supporters of a ‘No’ vote were mostly of a different political persuasion. 
The xenophobic Right, led by France’s Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage of UKIP 
and Matteo Salvini of Italy’s Lega Nord, all came out in force, cheering the 
Greeks all the way to Grexit. Shortly after the referendum, and before the Greek 
government’s capitulation, Germany’s Wolfgang Schäuble circulated a non-
paper floating the idea that “Greece should be offered swift negotiations on a 
time-out from the Eurozone, (...) over at least the next 5 years”. 
Within Greece, opposition to the Euro remained a minority view. Popular Unity 
(a party founded by 25 MPs who left SYRIZA in protest at the new austerity 
programme, explicitly committed to Grexit) foundered at the September 2015 
general election. According to the Eurobarometer survey3, no more than 29% 
of the population were against the single currency. 
Even though Grexit was narrowly averted in the summer of 2015, it has never 
really gone away. As late as February 2017, the ruling coalition seemed split 
between two alternative courses of action: either abide by the terms of the July 
2015 agreement (i.e. reverse its long-held hostility to reforms, and accept a 
                                                 
 3 The corresponding proportion of those opposed to “a European economic and monetary union 
with a single currency, the Euro” was 37% in Italy, 25% in Spain, and 23% in Portugal. See Standard Eurobarometer 86, November 2016. 
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greater dose of austerity), or prepare for exiting the Euro area and returning to 
a national currency. 
Beyond Greece, after Marine Le Pen’s bid for the French presidency was 
frustrated in May 2017, attention has shifted to Italy, where a disparate 
coalition encompassing Beppe Grillo’s Movimento Cinque Stelle as well as 
Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord, has called for a referendum on exiting the Euro. In 
view of that, our argument that Grexit cannot save Greece may be of some 
relevance to national debates elsewhere in Europe. 
The paper examines the case for Grexit by offering a detailed account of its 
likely effects. Its structure is as follows: section 2 analyses the transition, with 
the two currencies (old and new) coexisting. Section 3 charts the challenges 
facing the Greek economy in the short term, after the new national currency 
has become legal tender. Section 4 assesses prospects in the medium term, with 
Grexit complete and the new currency drastically devalued. Section 5 reviews 
the underlying weaknesses of Greece’s growth regime, and explains why these 
are unrelated to the nominal exchange rate. Section 6 discusses the conditions 
for an investment-led recovery, and shows why tackling them would be more 
difficult outside the Euro area. Section 7 sums up and concludes. 
 
2. The transition  
Between the moment of the decision to abandon the Euro and the establishment 
of the “New Drachma” as sole legal tender, there would inevitably be a period 
of transition. New banknotes have to be printed and new coins minted. This 
will take a few months and it is unlikely that it can happen in less than a month 
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(introducing the Euro in physical form took about two years).4 Until the New 
Drachma becomes physically available, both the Euro and some alternative 
means of payment would be circulating in parallel. 
One can think of a number of solutions to the parallel currency issue. All of 
them would require a drastic intensification of the existing capital controls, to 
prevent a massive bank run that would empty all Euro-denominated deposits. 
Issuing government-backed IOUs 5  (i.e. promissory notes) would probably 
suffer from severe credibility problems, disrupting the existing payment 
systems and creating confusion as to which payments can be made with IOUs 
and which cannot. 
Converting from the start most of the existing Euro accounts into Drachmas –
presumably at parity – after a bank holiday of (one hopes) a few days, would 
be an alternative. Given that New Drachma banknotes and coins would not be 
yet available, payments from and to government (pensions, taxes, etc.), utility 
bills, transactions involving larger businesses, and consumption purchases 
above a certain amount would all take place in Drachmas by non-cash means 
(bank transfers, card payments, etc.). The rest of the (smaller) transactions 
would be still in Euros. In order to supply the ATM machines with Euros, a 
small portion of existing bank accounts would have to be retained in the ‘old’ 
currency.6 
There would be snags with this solution. Converting Euro deposits into 
Drachmas without the consent of account holders, limiting access to cash, and 
paying (even partly) wages and salaries in Drachmas, would provoke 
widespread civil unrest. Second, technical problems to payment systems 
                                                 
 4 Capital Economics (2012), with Bootle as the lead author, think six months would be more likely. 5 IOU = “I owe you”. 6 This, in a nutshell, is the solution proposed by Capital Economics (2012). 
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caused by the conversion into Drachmas would prolong the duration of the 
required bank holiday and possibly that of the transition period itself.7 Third, 
during the transition Greece would be in effect without a functioning currency 
and virtually without cash. This would cause serious disruption. True, most 
business transactions are conducted by non-cash means, while the use of card 
payments for retail purchases increased after the imposition of capital controls.8 
Yet, Greece is still a cash economy. The bulk of consumer spending, especially 
involving purchases of below €20, is overwhelmingly done in cash.9 
No matter which solution to the parallel currency were to be chosen, a number 
of developments are likely. On the one hand, Euro banknotes in the hands of 
households and firms would be used sparingly and only when necessary. The 
rest would be hoarded and disappear from circulation. By contrast, the velocity 
of circulation of electronic Drachmas or IOUs would soar, as everybody would 
try to get rid of them. On the other hand, people would be eager to make 
payments in electronic Drachmas or IOUs but would demand to receive 
payment in Euros. In such conditions, a dual price system would promptly 
arise. Payments in Euros would command a discount, those in the parallel 
currency a hefty mark-up. The two price systems cannot be expected to 
stabilize any time soon. There would be considerable volatility and the usual 
overshooting for prices expressed in Drachmas is likely, soon rendering the 
original Euro-to-Drachma conversion rate meaningless. 
The effects of the transition on banking would be crippling. First, a sizeable 
part of Greek banks’ liquidity depends on funds from the ECB and the ELA.10 
                                                 
 7 IMF (2012, pp. 46-47) and Credit Suisse (2012, p. 2).  8 ECB Payments Statistics (26 September 2016) and Bank of Greece Payments Statistics (online).  9 See ECB (2011) and Bagnall et al (2014). Neither of these studies refers directly to Greece, but cash usage in Greece almost certainly lies in the upper end of their findings. 10 According to Bank of Greece estimates (2016, p. 22), Greek commercial banks depended on Eurozone funding for 28% of their liabilities. 
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The change in currency would terminally disrupt the respective flows. Second, 
the exposure of Greek banks to government debt, though smaller than in 2010, 
remains non-negligible.11 The adoption of the Drachma would erode the banks’ 
capital. Third, the already crippling weight of non-performing loans would 
certainly become bigger.12 The public would stop servicing their debts in Euros. 
However, even repayments in electronic Drachmas would be uncertain. They 
might be deferred in the expectation that the value of the Drachma might 
decline further. Thus, credit would dry-up completely. 
The impact of the transition on the real economy is also likely to be severe. 
Foreign trade would be a big casualty. Imports would freeze, as foreign 
exporters would require payment in hard currency, while Greek importers 
would be reluctant to part with their Euros. Widespread shortages would arise; 
rationing of fuel, medicines and essential foodstuffs might become necessary. 
Exports are unlikely to perform better. As most Greek exports of goods have a 
high import content, their production would be disrupted. According to the 
Federation of Greek Industries, “70% of Greek imports of goods represent 
inputs to production processes, while 25% of Greek imports are re-exported”.13 
Furthermore, export receipts in hard currency would be largely kept abroad. 
Finally, shortages, limited access to cash, and civil unrest would be unlikely to 
make Greece an attractive tourist destination. 
Output and employment are likely to decline further. Shortages of imported 
fuel, raw materials and foodstuffs would affect all economic activity, including 
basic services and tourism. Shortages would force many firms to cease 
                                                 
 11 In February 2017, Greek banks held in their asset portfolios €17.4bn in government loans, bonds and treasury bills. Source: Bank of Greece data. 12 In September 2016, non-performing exposures (NPE) of banks accounted for 45.2% of total exposures. See Bank of Greece (2016, p. 193). 13 ΣΕΒ (2017). 
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production on a permanent or temporary basis. Others would scale down 
operations by adopting a short working week. Incomes and domestic demand 
would plummet. The credit squeeze would multiply the number of defaults, 
while many firms would delay payments of wages, taxes and suppliers’ 
invoices. In short, the economy would freeze. 
Clearly, the more prolonged the transition, the more catastrophic the 
consequences. Its duration might be shortened by prior secret preparations. But 
that would be risky. On the one hand, the inevitable leaks would cause more 
chaos. On the other, secrecy would reinforce the charge that the decision to 
abandon the Euro was a coup d’ état. 
 
3. The short term 
At some point, the Drachma would be available in physical form as the sole 
legal tender in the land. At that early stage, Greece would lack the hard 
currency reserves14 to support the new currency. Thus, the Drachma would be 
floated and devalued. Nobody knows how big the devaluation might be: 
guesstimates range from 20% to 85%. 15  Assuming a 50% devaluation, the 
Drachma cost of all imported goods would double. Both the cost of living and 
production costs would rise steeply as a result. Due to the heavy losses that the 
entire Greek business sector has suffered16 in recent years, its capacity to absorb 
                                                 
 14 Bank of Greece reserves (excluding its contribution to ECB capital) currently amount to about 
€6.5bn. 15 Capital Economics (2012, p. 52) expected a 40%-50% fall in the Drachma’s nominal exchange rate. Buiter and Rahbari (2012) thought the nominal devaluation would be between 50% and 70%. A National Bank of Greece study (2012) anticipated a 65% drop in the nominal exchange rate and a 40% decline in the real exchange rate. The IMF (2012) seemed to assume a 50% fall in the real exchange rate. Christodoulakis (2014) put devaluation at up to 50%. Lapavitsas and Flassbeck (2015, p. 35) expected the exchange rate to stabilize at about 20% below the initial conversion rate. Also see Kazakos (2016, p. 112). 16 See ICAP, Greece in Figures, various editions. 
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the higher cost of imported inputs is limited. For most Greek firms, passing 
those costs onto prices would be a matter of survival – and pass them on they 
would, in the confident expectation that their competitors would do the same. 
Thus, there is no question that the devaluation would have substantial 
inflationary implications of the stagflationary variety. 
Estimates of the inflationary effect of devaluation vary.17 An inflationary burst 
of 25% to 30% in year 1 would erode the real purchasing power of earnings by 
an amount comparable to their cumulative loss over the last 7 years. Price 
controls and rationing might be introduced, in which case cost-of-living 
increases would simply shift to the informal market. Thus, domestic demand 
would drop substantially. 
Following devaluation, the non-convertible part of public debt would be 
unserviceable. Roughly 80% of Greece’s total debt is held by the official sector: 
Eurozone governments, the EFSF, the ESM, the ECB and the IMF.18 Part of the 
remainder has been issued to foreign private institutions under British law and 
cannot be re-denominated either. Only a small part of total debt is held 
domestically. Greece would have no option but to default on her European 
partners. The price of that would be exclusion from capital markets for the 
foreseeable future. In any case, debt cannot be wiped out just because a country 
refuses to service it: it would always be there, and sooner or later Greece would 
have to arrive at a settlement with her creditors. 
A similar situation would arise with private debts Greek firms have taken on 
with foreign firms. Servicing debt in Euros out of revenues mostly in Drachmas 
would be difficult. Some of the firms involved would default and close down. 
                                                 
 17 IMF (2012, p. 46): 35%; National Bank of Greece (2012, p. 6): 30%-32%; BNP: over 40%; Citigroup: 16%. The latter two estimates are cited in NBG (2012). 18 See Wall Street Journal “Greece’s Debt Due” (last updated May 16, 2017). 
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Others would face litigation at home and abroad. The slow pace of the Greek 
justice system may keep them half-alive in Greece, but they would be seen as 
bankrupt abroad, unable to do business with the rest of the EU. 
The fate of Greek banks would be of crucial importance. They would 
immediately lose access to funding afforded them by the Euro-system. 
Moreover, the re-denomination of their Greek public debt holdings into 
Drachmas would erode their capital (see above). Also, the liabilities of Greek 
banks to foreign residents (9% of total liabilities at the end of 2016) would be 
subject to a mismatch: the liabilities would be denominated in Euros, while 
their revenues and assets would be in Drachmas. In short, Greek commercial 
banks would be bankrupt. They would have to be recapitalized, and probably 
nationalized. If the latter, their policies would be determined by political rather 
than business criteria. In these conditions, the Bank of Greece would not remain 
independent, raising the question of whether it would be allowed to raise 
interest rates to a degree consistent with a credible anti-inflationary policy. 
As regards the fiscal balance, Greece has now achieved a primary surplus. 
Following Grexit, it would turn into deficit. Tax revenues would fall due to the 
compression of real incomes, while social and other public expenditures would 
be bound to increase. Moreover, the time discrepancy between public spending 
and tax collection on the one hand, and the initial burst of inflation on the other 
hand, would erode the real value of tax receipts. The non-payment culture 
fanned by the current governing parties when in opposition, would be 
intensified. In conditions of mounting budget shortfalls, the temptation to use 
the printing press would be strong.19 
                                                 
 19 The room for manoeuvre would be tighter if Greece decided to continue servicing some of its Euro denominated debts. The situation would be much worse if Greece were to lose all or part of EU subsidies.  
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A lot would depend on whether the decline in domestic demand would be 
counterbalanced by export growth and import substitution reasonably quickly 
after the initial shock. At present, both the current account and the trade deficits 
are small (0.6-0.8% of GDP).20 A large devaluation would wipe these out and 
turn them into surpluses. At least initially, this would be the result of a further 
compression of imports. Domestic output and employment, however, depend 
on exports and import substitution. Some import substitution cannot be ruled 
out, but it is unlikely to be extensive in the short run. The Greek economy is 
dominated by non-tradables, while the productive base of tradable goods is 
heavily dependent on imported inputs. 
That leaves exports. Again, in the short run no impressive results can be 
expected on that front either. Before the crisis, the export base of the Greek 
economy was the narrowest in the EU. During the crisis, in the context of large 
internal devaluation, unit labour costs decreased, so export prices fell (though 
later, and by less).21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 20 See Ameco (March 2017) and Bank of Greece (latest 2017). 21 In 2010-2016, Greek unit labour costs for the economy as a whole fell by 12.3%, while the EU-28 average increased by 6%. In manufacturing, unit labour costs fell by 27.8% in Greece (in 2010-2015), versus only 1.1% in the Euro area of 12 economies. The deflator for exports of goods indicates that Greek prices started to fall in 2013; the cumulative decline in 2010-2016 was 12%. In the EU-28, prices of exported goods increased by 1.5%. See Ameco (June 2017). 
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Figure 1a Nominal unit labour costs (2010-2016) 
 
Note: Unit labour cost defined as the ratio of labour costs to labour productivity. Compensation of 
employees: all industries. Total employment: all industries, in persons (domestic concept). 
Index 2010=100. Source: Eurostat data (tipslm20). 
 
Figure 1b Nominal unit labour costs (1995-2016) 
 
Note: Unit labour cost defined as the ratio of labour costs to labour productivity. Compensation of 
employees: all industries. Total employment: all industries, in persons (domestic concept). 
Index 1995=100. Source: Eurostat data (tipslm20). 
Yet, export growth was anaemic (with occasional false dawns).22 
                                                 
 22 In 2009-2016, the share of exports of goods and services to GDP was 27.5% on average. In 2000-2008, when GDP was higher, that share had been 21.6%. In particular, exports of goods are 
Why Grexit cannot save Greece 
12 
Figure 2a Exports of goods and services (2009-2016) 
 
Note: Exports of goods and services, in billion euros, in constant prices. Index 2009=100.  
Source: Ameco data (National accounts). 
 
Figure 2b Exports of goods and services (2000-2016) 
 
Note: Exports of goods and services, in billion euros, in constant prices. Index 2000=100. 
Source: Ameco data (National accounts). 
                                                 
 remarkably weak: 14.2% of the GDP in 2009-2016, relative to 9.3% in 2000-2008 – by far the lowest share in the EU-28. Note that because of decreasing receipts from shipping, exports of 
services were lower in 2016 than they had been in 2008. Calculations based on the Ameco data. 
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The lacklustre performance of Greek exports, despite the fall in prices, point to 
a structural element behind the slow reflexes of the Greek growth model and 
its limited capacity to adapt. If this is the case, a change in relative prices 
between imports and exports would not address structural problems, nor 
would it have immediate effect: export orientation is neither instantaneous nor 
costless. Grexit and devaluation would result in a current account surplus but 
this would be due to the compression of imports rather than a surge in exports 
or extensive import substitution. As for the surplus, it would be unlikely to 
convince markets sufficiently to stabilize the Drachma. 
To sum up: in the first, say, couple of years post-Grexit, the contraction of 
domestic demand due to the fall in real incomes, the turmoil in the banking 
system and the supply of credit and the uncertainty as to which firm is solvent 
would weigh heavily on economic activity. On the other hand, export growth 
or import substitution would be unable to offset the loss of output and 
employment. The impact of these developments on GDP and employment 
would be severe. Again, the available estimates23 vary from 13% to 22% – on top 
of the 26% decline since 2008. All of them imply an unemployment rate at 30% or 
more. 
Losses would not be equitably distributed. In the short term after Grexit, real 
wages and pensions would fall due to the large increase in the cost of living 
(what would happen later is anybody’s guess; see discussion in the next 
section). Savers forced to convert their Euro deposits into Drachmas (typically 
those with modest savings, not in a position to keep accounts abroad) would 
also lose. Another set of losers would be businesses servicing their debts 
scrupulously. Winners from devaluation would be the insolvent debtors and 
                                                 
 23 Estimates of real GDP contraction following Grexit: IMF (2012): 13%; National Bank of Greece (2012): 22%; BNP: 20%; Citigroup: 17%. The latter two figures cited in NBG (2012). 
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holders of significant assets abroad. As Christodoulakis pointed out: “Grexit 
would be the reckless debtors’ reward”.24 The damage due to the distortion of 
incentives would linger on for years. 
 
4. The medium term  
Most economists (including those favouring Grexit) probably agree that the 
first couple of years would be tortuous. Opinions diverge on the assessment of 
medium term effects. Those willing to contemplate Grexit pin their hopes on 
the ability of devaluation to engineer eventually the desired rebalancing of the 
economy in favour of tradables.  
If devaluation is to succeed in the medium term, competitiveness gains must 
be sustained and built-upon. This depends on two vital preconditions: a) that 
the initial inflationary burst would be contained, a devaluation spiral 
prevented, and the exchange rate stabilized; and b) that low-priced Greek 
assets would attract sizeable foreign and domestic private investment. Let us 
consider them in turn. 
On paper, it is feasible to devise a strategy combining measures of monetary, 
fiscal and incomes policies that would ‘lock-in’ the remaining beneficial effects 
of devaluation (after the initial inflationary burst), arrest the slide into further 
devaluation, secure the foreign exchange reserves needed for the stabilization 
of the currency, and make room for the transfer of resources towards 
investment and exports. Most economists (including those favouring Grexit25) 
would consider the early adoption of such a policy as the necessary condition 
                                                 
 24 Christodoulakis (2014, pp. 143-146). 25 See for instance Capital Economics (2012, pp. 54-55). 
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for the medium term success of the whole operation. For instance, interest rates 
should be allowed to increase above inflation if necessary and the fiscal balance 
should be preserved in order to avoid the need for monetary financing of the 
deficit. Crucially, a protracted fall in real wages is a prerequisite. Without it, 
the devaluation would fail to achieve anything permanent. Finally, all this 
would have to be credible: the public should be convinced that the policy 
would be adhered to consistently. 
The problem is that, on current form, Greece would be unable to implement 
such a programme. Influential interest groups in or around the public sector 
would demand and, probably, obtain pay rises at least as high as inflation. 
These would (sooner or later and despite the slump) spill over throughout the 
economy generating a wage-price spiral stronger than the one witnessed in the 
1980s. Pay rises and new public sector jobs, as well as pension increases, would 
lead to higher fiscal deficits that could be financed only by printing money. The 
newly nationalized banks would not be allowed to contain inflationary 
pressures. In such an environment, Greece would be unable to stabilise the 
Drachma: it would descend to an inflationary cycle with no end in sight.26 
Turning to the second precondition: in the conditions likely to prevail after 
Grexit, the low price of Greek assets would only attract the most risk loving of 
investors. Low asset prices would generally be outweighed by uncertainty over 
exchange rates and rising costs and prices. The incentive to invest would be 
stifled by political instability and, possibly, law and order issues. To these one 
                                                 
 26 Historical precedents on inflationary pressures after a slump are instructive. In Argentina, GDP declined by about 20% in 1998-2002, while unemployment averaged 21% in 2002 (having peaked at 25%). Yet, after a 75% devaluation in 2002, price (and wage) inflation in the same year peaked at 41%, averaging 26%. See IMF (2004, p.24). Something similar occurred in Greece in 1944. After liberation, in a ruined land with hundreds of thousands of destitute unemployed, a wage-price spiral (driven by prices in that case) caused the failure of five devaluations to stabilize the currency (one each in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1948 and 1949). See Eliades (1954). 
Why Grexit cannot save Greece 
16 
should add the perennial disincentives (bureaucratic obstacles and hostile 
attitude to private investment at all levels of government) that led to low rates 
of foreign direct investment in the past. Most foreign corporations would avoid 
the minefield. Greek businesses with capital parked abroad would have every 
reason to wait until the situation cleared up. 
Our conclusion is that Grexit would be a disastrous mistake that should be 
ruled out decisively. The first couple of years would be worse than anything 
experienced under extreme austerity.27 Medium term benefits would at best be 
uncertain, dependent on a miraculous transformation of Greek society and 
politics. As for the economy, it would face the risk of disintegration. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that economists better acquainted with Greece 
are adamantly opposed to Grexit. Buiter and Rahbari (2010) put the argument 
succinctly: “The key rigidities in economies like Greece are real rigidities, not 
Keynesian nominal rigidities. (…) Unless the balance of economic and political 
power is changed fundamentally, a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
would soon lead to adjustments of domestic costs and prices that would restore 
the old uncompetitive real equilibrium”. 
 
5. Structural and institutional blockages  
The immediate cause of the Greek depression since 2010 was no doubt the fall 
in domestic demand. However, the underlying problem was the weakness of 
                                                 
 27 Throughout the paper we have implicitly assumed that aid of some sort from the EU would be available. Without it, the effects of Grexit would be worse. If assistance were generous, it would alleviate the effects of developments described above, without altering them significantly. In any case, assistance would not be unconditional. Indeed, in many ways Greece would be more dependent on EU aid than at present, as she would be facing problems that are more urgent and 
“existential” in nature. 
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Greece’s growth regime and the structural and institutional blockages 
underpinning it. For almost two decades before the crisis, Greece enjoyed a 
certain prosperity, spread unequally but widely. A broad coalition of political, 
social and economic actors coalesced in support of that growth model 28 : 
business interests lobbying politicians for access to public contracts; labour 
unions in state-owned enterprises 29 ; and middle-class professionals accus-
tomed to evading taxes.30 The most important of those blockages are briefly 
reviewed below. 
Weak structural competitiveness 
Greek exports of goods and services as a share of GDP is (and was) well below 
the EU-28 average, while Greek exports of goods alone are by far the lowest 
among all EU countries. Furthermore, most Greek exports involve low income-
elasticity products, mostly of indifferent quality, and of rather low 
technological content.31 These competitive disadvantages stem from structural 
and institutional factors, including product market rigidities and small firm 
size. 
Product market rigidities. On entering the EU, Greece opened up its exposed 
sectors to foreign competition but increased the protection of sheltered sectors. 
As a result, the latter flourished while the former withered.32 Product market 
                                                 
 28 As Pontusson and Baccaro (2016, p. 200) have put it, “growth models rest on and are supported 
by clearly identifiable ‘social blocs’, that is, coalitions of social forces, typically straddling the class 
divide, that can legitimately claim to represent the ‘national interest’”. See also Hall (2017). 29 For a detailed exposition of the skewed representation of workers by unions, and how this distorted union policy on the all-important issue of pension reform in the 2000s, see Matsaganis (2007). 30 For an analysis of how interest groups, far from being the servants of political parties, as the standard view had it, eventually became their masters, distorting decision making and preventing policy adjustment, see Iordanoglou (2013). 31 See Kastelli and Zografakis (2017). 32 See Doxiadis (2013) for an account of the shift in attention on the part of Greek policy makers away from exposed firms and industries producing tradeable goods towards the sheltered non-tradeables sector. 
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rigidities are endemic in non-tradeable industries (mostly services), where 
incumbents benefit from barriers to entry, administratively set prices, fees or 
profit margins, and protected public monopolies. In contrast, firms producing 
tradeable goods – being open to competition – have nowhere to hide. They face 
artificially high production costs (from inflated energy bills to pay awards 
tailored to conditions in non-tradeable industries), as well as those arising from 
compliance to regulations (or, more generally, from dealing with state 
agencies). Such costs squeeze the profit margins of firms producing tradeable 
goods, and dilute the incentives of prospective entrepreneurs to enter the 
respective industries. 
Structural reform as practised in Greece under the terms of the austerity 
programmes provided a (at best) partial response to the problem. Product 
market liberalization, although potentially more promising than labour market 
deregulation 33 , was pursued with less determination, failing to break the 
stranglehold of business interests over large parts of the Greek economy.34 
Small firm size. Optimum firm size varies across industries. Therefore, the size 
distribution will depend on the composition of a country’s manufacturing 
sector. Nevertheless, the persistent preponderance of very small firms in Greece 
goes beyond composition effects. The average size of Greek firms in terms of 
                                                 
 33 Barnes et al. (2011) have estimated that moving to the OECD average in terms of labour market regulation could raise real GDP per person in Greece by 6%, while a similar move in terms of product market regulation could add as much as 22%. As argued in a recent IMF report (2016, p.121), “Product market reforms should be implemented forcefully, as they boost output even under weak macroeconomic conditions. In contrast, lowering unemployment benefits and easing job protection should be accompanied by other policies to offset their short-term cost; alternatively, they might even be grandfathered or be enacted with their implementation deferred 
until a (suitably defined) better time arrives.” 34 On the trials and tribulations of attempts to reform product markets in Greece, see Katsoulakos 
et al. (2017). As argued by Ioannides and Pissarides (2015): “Labor market reforms have been given greater priority in Greece than product market reforms, mistakenly in our view. Whether this was because successive Greek governments found it easier to reform labor markets than 
product markets or because the troika insisted on them is a moot point” (p. 364). 
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number of employees is the smallest in the EU: 3.2 employees in 2014. Firms 
employing fewer than 10 workers represented 95% of all Greek manufacturing 
firms but accounted for 42% of the sector’s employment and 24% of its value 
added. At the other end of the spectrum, larger firms (those employing over 
250 persons) represented a miniscule proportion of all firms in manufacturing 
(0.2%), but accounted for 21% of the sector’s employment and 37% of its value 
added. These shares are too low by European standards: only in Italy and 
Portugal did larger firms account for such low proportions of manufacturing 
employment and value added. Labour productivity in firms employing more 
than 250 workers was three times as large as labour productivity in those 
employing up to 10 workers.35 
Figure 3a Employment share of small firms in manufacture (2014) 
 
Note: Number of workers in manufacturing firms with fewer than 10 employees as a proportion of 
all manufacturing employment. Source: Eurostat data (sbs_sc_sca_r2). 
 
                                                 
 35 Data Source: Eurostat, Structural Business Statistics. 
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The disadvantages of small firm size are well documented. Very small firms 
miss the advantages of scale. Apart from poor labour productivity, firms 
employing less than 10 workers lack the resources or the vision to sell in 
markets outside their locality, and are likely to have a limited capacity for 
technological sophistication. 
Figure 3b Small firms as a share of all firms in manufacture (2014) 
 
Note: Number of manufacturing firms with fewer than 10 employees as a proportion of all 
manufacturing firms. Source: Eurostat data (sbs_sc_sca_r2). 
What are the advantages? Tax and labour legislation is favourable to small 
firms. Moreover, small firms find it easier to avoid paying taxes and social 
security contributions and to circumvent labour regulations (about minimum 
wages, paid vacations, work schedules). Indeed, it has been argued that such 
advantages provide powerful disincentives for firms to grow. 36 In contrast, 
                                                 
 36 Burtless (2001). See also Doxiadis (2013). 
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bigger firms are at the receiving end of high social security contributions and 
strict labour market regulations. 
Structurally low competitiveness stemming from product market rigidities and 
small firm size cannot be fixed by changing the nominal exchange rate, and will 
have to be dealt with no matter what currency Greece will be using. 
Low and falling savings 
Savings in Greece are too low to secure an adequate level of investment funded 
by domestic resources. This is not only because of long periods of negative 
public savings. Private savings too represent a low and falling percentage of 
GDP. The fall in private savings is not exclusively cyclical. It is in part a trend 
going back some time. 
A large devaluation and the consequent substantial decline in the real value of 
savings is certainly not the ideal way to steer savers’ behaviour in the desired 
direction, while Greece’s exclusion from the outside world would restrict the 
country’s ability to mount a sizeable investment effort. 
Pensions and welfare  
In spite of fast rising social spending in the 1990s and the 2000s, the 
configuration of Greece’s social protection system was so dysfunctional that it 
rendered it particularly unfit for the looming challenge.37 When the crisis hit, 
there was little to prevent the hundreds of thousands of families suffering 
losses in terms of jobs and/or earnings from falling into poverty.38 
Social spending peaked in 2009 in absolute terms, though in relative terms it 
continued to grow until 2012. Thereafter, as the cuts took effect, expenditure on 
                                                 
 37 See Matsaganis (2011). 38 See Matsaganis (2014). 
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social protection fell faster than GDP. Not all policy areas fared equally. 
Pension expenditure has continued its upward trend to over 18% of GDP, as 
the effect of rising numbers of pensioners more than offset that of nominal 
benefit cuts (which were certainly non-negligible). More than had hitherto been 
the case, the growth in pensions spending crowded out other components of Greek 
welfare. 
Greek pensions have always been fragmented, inequitable and unsustainable.39 
State subsidies to pension funds were the single most important factor behind 
the build-up of public debt. The 2010-2016 reforms have slowed the growth of 
government subsidies to the pensions system, but have not reduced their share 
in GDP. In 2015, such subsidies exceeded 10% of GDP, compared to 2.5% in the 
Euro area as a whole.40 
Given the large numbers and low age of Greek pensioners 41, the pensions 
system is bound to be more unaffordable in the medium term even if the 
employment outlook improves substantially. Devaluation would not alter the 
nature of the problem. It would reappear in the shape of a dilemma: inflate 
away the burden of state subsidies to the pensions system (thus imposing 
bigger real income losses on pensioners than those already incurred), or 
compensate them for inflation and perpetuate pension deficits? Our guess is 
that the Greek political system would try to do the latter and end up doing the 
former. 
 
                                                 
 39 See Tinios (2005), Featherstone (2005) and Matsaganis (2007). 40 OECD (2016, p. 33) and IMF (2017, p. 8). 41 In 2016, the number of pensioners had grown to 2.7 million as the number of workers had shrunk to 3.6 million. In the meantime, retiring at a tender age continued to be relatively easy: 25% of all new retirees in spring 2015 were aged below 55 (in the public sector the figure was 34%). 
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Narrow tax base and poor tax administration 
Before the crisis, the Greek tax system suffered from extensive tax evasion and 
avoidance (due to widespread exemptions), while the tax base was narrow. The 
quality of tax administration was poor, antiquated and subject to political 
interference. In spite of recent reforms, tax evasion is as rife as ever, tax 
collection rates low and tax arrears at a record high. Economic hardship has 
been a key factor to those developments – but high tax rates, punitive fines, 
poor tax administration, and inefficiencies in justice42 have all played a role. 
Constantly shifting rules have exacerbated uncertainty. 
Yet, beneath the surface lie important improvements. When (if) the economy 
rebounds, tax rates can be allowed to fall. In the meantime, the Greek tax 
system has become more balanced: VAT exemptions have been eliminated; a 
wider personal income tax base has been legislated; the relative weight of 
property taxes has been raised from the previous negligible level; and tax 
administration has become more competent and more autonomous from 
political interference. None of these would have happened without outside 
pressure (in this case, from the EU-ECB-IMF Troika), nor can recent gains be 
sustained in the event of Greece breaking loose from the Euro area (or, possibly, 
the EU). 
Inefficiency of public administration 
Most public agencies operate under no real incentive structure, no clearly 
defined tasks, and no evaluation of their performance. As a result, they are 
(with some exceptions) unable to carry out tasks on time and within budget. 
Often, they act as hindrances to, not facilitators of, economic activity. 
                                                 
 42 With respect to the enforcement of contracts, the World Bank ranked the Greek judicial system 133rd out of 190 countries in its most recent Doing Business report. See also IMF (2017, p. 21). 
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Bureaucratic obstacles are top concerns of domestic and foreign businesses. 
These issues are well known and well documented: no reason to dwell further 
upon them.43 
Nevertheless, one issue deserves attention: the gap in pay and conditions 
separating public from private sector workers. Even accounting for skills and 
experience, civil servants and other public sector employees earn significantly 
more than their counterparts in private firms.44 Only at the top are earnings 
higher among private sector workers. Wage differentials widened during the 
crisis: workers in private firms suffered greater wage cuts as well as more job 
losses. 45  Moreover, in spite of recent labour market reforms, public sector 
employees still enjoy better benefits, easier working conditions, and far greater 
job security.46 This represents a massive distortion of the structure of incentives 
facing entrants to the labour market. Given the chance, most young Greeks 
would opt for a public sector job rather than employ their abilities more 
productively elsewhere. This obviously plays out at the expense of the exposed 
sectors of the economy. 
None of the enduring structural and institutional blockages reviewed above 
would be addressed by changing the nominal exchange rate. The argument 
that devaluation would alter the balance of advantage in favour of tradables 
presupposes that the advantage it would give Greek firms would be sustained. 
We argue that devaluation is far more likely to generate a wage-price spiral 
that would wipe out competitive gains. Furthermore, departure from the Euro 
                                                 
 43 See various editions of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report and the 
World Bank’s Doing Business reports. See also OECD (2016, p. 81). 44 See Papapetrou (2003) and Christopoulou & Monastiriotis (2013).  45 See Christopoulou & Monastiriotis (2016). 46 See Matsaganis (forthcoming). 
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area (if the past is any guide) is likely to eliminate the pressure for reform, and 
leave Greece more insulated than ever. 
 
6. Recovery within the Euro area  
The adjustment programmes offered to Greece shows that the country’s 
lenders were aware of structural blockages. But they demanded simultaneous 
progress on all fronts. They offered no sense of priorities and no clear 
sequencing of the necessary changes. They envisaged a big bang: the rapid 
transformation of Greek economy and society almost overnight. 
Furthermore, the focus on reducing labour costs deflected attention from the 
full range of factors that stymied productivity growth, and caused Greek firms 
to lose ground in international markets. The labour market reforms adopted 
are best suited to a growth regime based on lower wages and lower skills. This 
is contentious on social and political grounds, and questionable on economic 
grounds. Yet, no Greek government advocated an alternative strategy, aiming 
for a higher-skill, higher-wage equilibrium. Instead, domestic actors passively 
resisted those changes that were most disruptive to the status quo, as if it were 
possible somehow to resurrect the previous growth regime (whose failure had 
led to the crisis). 
Greece urgently needs recovery but has a limited capacity for reform. The 
problem is how to weave the expansionary stimulus needed for economic 
recovery now into the medium-term reform effort aiming to address the 
blockages discussed above. On that score, Dani Rodrik’s47 advice seems sound. 
Higher priority ought to be given to a limited set of objectives. Ambitious 
                                                 
 47 See Rodrik (2016). 
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reforms (such as the general overhaul of the public sector) are not to be 
abandoned, but introduced at a more gradual pace, and allowed greater 
latitude.  
Where is the necessary demand stimulus going to come from? It cannot come 
from a burst of consumption financed by increased public spending. Greece 
would be unable to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy in the foreseeable 
future. Even if that were possible, it would be inadvisable: it would soon put 
pressure on the balance of trade, while doing nothing to tackle issues on the 
supply side. 
What remains is investment-led stimulus. In volume terms, investment fell by 
about 65% since its peak in 2007. 48  There is plenty of scope for higher 
investment. Given fiscal constraints, public investment can only play a limited 
role. Also, since private savings have fallen to their lowest level for decades, an 
adequate investment effort cannot be financed out of domestic resources alone: 
foreign funding is indispensable. True, an increase in investment will cause a 
deterioration of the country’s current account. But investment (unlike 
consumption) creates the conditions for those obligations to be met in the 
future through increased production and exports. 
It is therefore essential that targeted reforms specifically related to the success 
of an investment-led strategy be given priority. Privatizing poorly managed 
public assets in transport, energy, tourism and real estate will attract foreign 
investment. Clearing up the backlog of non-performing bank loans49 will pave 
the way to easing the credit crunch. Cutting red tape will remove a key obstacle 
to job creation and business growth. Reducing the burden of taxes and social 
                                                 
 48 The share of total investment in GDP declined from 26.0% in 2007 to 11.7% in 2016. Private investment fell from 21.2% to 7.7% of GDP. Own calculations based on Ameco data. 49 In 2016, non-performing loans represented 45 % of banks’ total exposure. 
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security contributions, and making tax rules more stable, will also have a 
positive effect. Simplifying legislation and streamlining the judicial process 
will create a less arbitrary and more effective institutional environment. 
Some of the above reforms have already been signed up to by successive Greek 
governments (including the current one), but have stalled. This suggests that 
they are highly unlikely to happen without external pressure, for instance if 
Greece were to exit the Euro area – or, worse, leave the EU. 
Restructuring the public debt – number one priority of the current Greek 
government – would undoubtedly be of great help, as it would reduce 
uncertainty about debt sustainability, improve liquidity, and make 
international financial institutions less unwilling to fund investment in Greece. 
But on its own, without sweeping reforms to facilitate an investment-led 
strategy for growth, debt restructuring would not be enough. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Grexit would be pain for no gain. The first couple of years would be 
excruciating. Economic stabilization in the medium term would require a 
restrictive policy stance to preserve some of the competitiveness gains from 
devaluation and prevent the perpetuation of an inflationary spiral. Would 
Greece be able to pursue – credibly – such an agenda? This is highly unlikely. 
Political and media elites would fail to support it, while influential interest 
groups would resist it. If Greece had the ability to carry out a stabilization effort 
of such magnitude, she would not have been in the position she is now. In this 
context, the risk of a complete disintegration of the economy would be 
unacceptably high. 
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The fundamental blockages of the Greek economy are structural and 
institutional in nature. Adopting another currency would address none of 
them; investment-centred reforms might. Would reforms be more likely to be 
adopted post-Grexit? Once again, the answer can only be an emphatic ‘no’. The 
vincolo esterno50 remains indispensable. In the past 30 years the important shifts 
in policy and the major reforms (such as the stabilisation policy of the ‘90s and 
the reforms of the banking and telecommunications sectors) came about 
because of EU influence. Leaving the Euro area (or, worse, the EU) would take 
the wind out of the reformers’ sails, and condemn the country to insularity and 
decline. 
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